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FORUM: COMMENT 
A Profusion of Chancery Reform 
JAMES OLDHAM 
The refrain that law and equity cannot peaceably cohabit the same court 
is familiar and persistent. In his 1790 treatise on contracts, Joseph Powell 
protested that blending law and equity was "subversive of first principles."1 
He claimed, "That a right in itself purely legal cannot be the proper sub-
ject of discussion in a jurisdiction purely equitable, and that a right purely 
equitable, cannot be the proper subject of a purely legal jurisdiction, are 
axioms that cannot be denied," adding for good measure: "It is a proposi-
tion as self-evident as that black is not red, or white black."2 Almost two 
centuries later, in a provocative 1974 essay called The Death o/Contract, 
Grant Gilmore asserted that the legal doctrine of consideration in contract 
law and the equitable doctrine of promissory estoppel were like "matter 
and anti-matter," and "The one thing that is clear is that these two contra-
dictory propositions cannot live comfortably together: in the end one must 
swallow the other Up."3 
Gilmore and Powell notwithstanding, law and equity have been able to 
live together successfully, if occasionally uneasily, for well over a centu-
ry. In England the crucial procedural event, marking the end of a bumpy 
journey of at least four decades of fits and starts, was the Judicature Act 
1873.4 The fact that fusion was finally achieved in 18735 is well-known.6 
I. J. J. Powell, Essay Upon the Law of Contracts and Agreements, 2 vols. (London: For 
J. Johnson and T. Whieldon, 1790), I: viii. 
2. Ibid., ix. 
3. Grant Gilmore, The Death of Contract (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1974), 
61. 
4. 36 & 37 Vict., c. 66. 
5. Augmented by additional provisions in the Judicature Act 1875. 
6. See generally Patrick Polden, "Mingling the Waters: Personalities, Politics and the 
Making of the Supreme Court of Judicature," Cambridge Law loumal61 (2002): 575. 
James Oldham is St. Thomas More Professor of Law and Legal History at George-
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Not well-known, however, has been the story of exactly how this happened. 
Michael Lobban tells that story in meticulous detail with commendable 
clarity, starting with the early 1800s and the quarter-century when Chan-
cery was in the hands of John Scott, Lord Chancellor Eldon. 
Lobban has clearly spent many long hours thrashing through nine-
teenth-century parliamentary history and associated pamphlet and pop-
ular literature. He has put this hard labor to good use already in earlier 
work describing the fate of the civil jury in England in the nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries.? In "Preparing for Fusion," Lobban gives read-
ers a panoramic view of the dominant personalities in and proposals for 
Chancery reform in the nineteenth century, as well as of the many ob-
stacles, uncertainties, and vacillations. He states, for example, that when 
Lord Chancellor Cottenham retired in June 1850, "Once more, the pro-
fession was hopelessly divided on how to proceed; and all the old argu-
ments were replayed."8 Yet enough momentum had by then been produced 
to keep the process moving forward, and it is interesting to see the re-
formers seeking out in 1850-51 advice from the great American codifier, 
David Dudley Field.9 By this time, significant reform steps had already 
been taken. Two new Vice Chancellors had been authorized in 1840; the 
Six Clerks and the Sworn Clerks had been eliminated in 1842; and much 
of the piecework fee system for judges and court officers had been con-
verted to annual salaries.1O In 1851 a new court of appeal was created; 
and in 1852, among other measures, the office of master in Chancery was 
abolished. 11 This piecemeal process continued, culminating in the Judi-
cature Acts 1873 and 1875. 
Yet even with the benefit of the voluminous parliamentary records and 
secondary sources examined by Lobban, puzzles remain. Was Eldon's fa-
mous indecisiveness truly responsible for the picture of Chancery decadence 
painted by Charles Dickens in Bleak House? Despite contemporary beliefs 
that this was so, statistical proof was either unavailable, contradictory, or 
7. Michael Lobban, "The Strange Life of the English Civil Jury, 1837-1914," in "The 
Dearest Birth Right of the People of England": The Jury in the History of the Common Law, 
ed. J. W. Cairns and Grant McLeod (Oxford and Portland, Ore: Hart Publishing, 2002), 173. 
8. Michael Lobban, "Preparing for Fusion: Reforming the Nineteenth-Century Court of 
Chancery, Part I," Law and History Review 22 (2004): 422-23. 
9. Ibid., "Part II," n. 94 and 584. 
10. Ibid., 568, 570, 573. 
11. Ibid., 582-83. In passing, it could be noted that a chronology of enacted reform mea-
sures would be extremely helpful to readers. Lobban's narrative moves through a blizzard 
of proposals, some of which succeeded, but most of which did not, and it is easy to get lost 
in the many parliamentary meanderings. 
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at best, inconclusive. Not until 1840, long after Eldon's departure from 
office, did anyone actually inspect the Registrars' books to produce reliable 
data on the number of cases actually heard by the Lord Chancellor. 12 
Each of Lord Eldon's judicial notebooks begins with the following hand-
written admonition to himself: "Thou shal't do no unrighteousness in judg-
ment."13 Eldon was clearly a conscientious judge who deliberated long, 
often to excess. A story circulated in the nineteenth century that barrister 
George Rose was asked one day to substitute for the regular note-taker in 
Eldon's court, and to give an account of any decision made, and the fol-
lowing lines were Rose's only entries: 
Mr. Leach made a speech, 
Angry, neat, but wrong: 
Mr. Hart, on the other part, 
Was heavy, dull, and long: 
Mr. Parker made the case darker, 
Which was dark enough without: 
Mr. Cooke cited his book, 
And the Chancellor said-"I doubt."14 
Despite Eldon's "learned doubtfulness,"15 was he overburdened? His sur-
viving judicial notes supply some useful data. Eldon became Lord Chan-
cellor on April 14, 1801 (though continuing simultaneously as Chief Jus-
tice of Common Pleas until May 21); he resigned on February 7, 1806, but 
resumed office on April 1, 1807, continuing until his resignation on April 
30, 1827. Except for a small sprinkling of cases, Eldon's judicial notes 
cease in early 1814, which coincides with Parliaments's creation of the 
office of Vice Chancellor in 1813, after which, according to Lobban, "the 
Lord Chancellor soon ceased to hear original causes."16 For the ten full 
calendar years from 1801-14 during which Eldon was Lord Chancellor, 
his judicial notes show the following: 
12. Ibid., 569 (describing the documentary research of Edwin Field, which supported the 
case being made for additional judges). 
13. Emphasis added. Eldon's notebooks, manuscripts, and monographs are in the collec-
tion of the Georgetown University Law Library. 
14. Croake James [J. Paterson], Curiosities a/the Law and Lawyers (London: Low, Mar-
ston, Searle, and Rivington, 1882), 86-87. Leach, Hart, Parker, and Cooke were leading 
barristers of the day. Cooke was the author of a well-known treatise on bankruptcy, which 
is undoubtedly the book he was citing. 
15. Lobban, "Part I," 408 (quoting critic John Williams). 
16. Ibid., 393. 
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Table 1. New and Continued Cases in Chancery Heard by Lord Chancellor Eldon 
No. of cases continued 
Year No. of new cases from earlier year(s) 
1802 96 3 
1803 45 9 
1804 61 4 
1805 44 6 
1808 48 0 
1809 28 7 
1810 29 6 
1811 27 3 
1812 38 2 
1813 52 3 
Total: 468 43 Grand total: 511 
Source: Eldon MSS, Georgetown University Law Library, Washington, D.C. 
Apart from the burst of activity in the first year, these figures do indeed 
reflect a deliberative pace, especially the years showing only seven or eight 
cases per term, and tend to confirm the critics who pointed to Eldon's "over 
anxiety to do strict justice."I? The pattern for 1801-13 of about fifty cases 
per year, however, is substantially higher than the ten cases per year that 
critic John Williams claimed Eldon heard during the years 1813-21.18 Per-
haps this was due to the change from hearing original causes to hearing 
appeals once the Vice Chancellor arrived in 1813. Alternatively, there may 
discrepancies in sources used to count cases. Many of the cases recorded 
in Lord Eldon's judicial notes, for example, are unreported. 
In 1810, another critic, Michael Taylor, claimed that there were 140 
Chancery causes pending, which would take eight years to resolve. Taylor 
and other Whig activists, according to Lobban, sought to have a commit-
tee formed to get to the bottom of the delays, but the Tory resistance of 
Lord Redesdale 19 and others forestalled this effort and persuaded the re-
formers of the moment that what was needed was another judge, eventu-
ally resulting in the creation in 1813 of the office of Vice Chancellor. Re-
desdale, the former John Mitford, is described by Lobban merely as the 
former Lord Chancellor of Ireland, but it is worth noting that Redesdale 
(Mitford) had a large investment in Chancery procedures as they stood. 
Redesdale (Mitford) was called to the bar in 1777, and three years later, 
he published A Treatise on Pleadings in Suits in the Court of Chancery by 
17. Ibid., 404, quoting The Times, S March lSI!. 
IS. Ibid., 40S. 
19. Ibid., 409. 
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English Bill, 20 which quickly became accepted as authoritative21 and helped 
Mitford acquire a large Chancery practice.22 
Reformer Taylor and those who agreed with him, on the other hand, 
claimed that the predicable result of creating a Vice Chancellor would be 
that every case would be appealed from the Vice Chancellor to the Chan-
cellor, accomplishing nothing but the insertion of another layer of adjudi-
cation and more delay. Interestingly, Eldon in his retirement (1730) agreed, 
writing in a letter to Lyndhurst that the office of Vice Chancellor "retard-
ed my progress at an enormous Expense to my Suitors"-"hardly anything 
passed for some Time, in the Vice Chancellor's Court, and under different 
Vice Chancellors, which was not made, almost instantaneously, the Sub-
ject of Appeal."23 
The Vice Chancellor, in fact, is something of a phantom in Lobban's 
narrative. If the office was almost wholly counterproductive, as suggest-
ed, how did Parliament come to be persuaded by 1840 that two new Vice 
Chancellors were needed, after which, according to Lobban, "the problem 
of arrears ... fell into abeyance once more"?24 And exactly what did hap-
pen in the 1810s after the office of Vice Chancellor was created? Lobban's 
Figure 3 shows the causes ready for hearing at the end of Michaelmas, and 
after oscillations from about ten to 150 cases from 1760-1800, there is a 
slow rise to over 300 in 1813 and then a spike to above 800 for 1816-17, 
followed by a plummet to 200. What might account for these dramatic 
variations? There seems here to be a story untold. 
Inevitably, research such as that in Michael Lobban's illuminating study, 
"Preparing for Fusion," answers many questions but raises many new ones. 
Those who in the future reconsider the variegated elements of Chancery 
reform will have the great advantage of the story that Lobban has so labo-
riously and carefully told. Lobban escorts the reader through a near-impen-
20. John Mitford, A Treatise on Pleadings in Suits in the Court of Chancery by English 
Bill (London: W. Owen, 1780). 
21. See William Holdsworth, History of English Law, 17 vols. (London: Methuen 1903-
72; reprint 16 vols., London: Methuen, Sweet and Maxwell, 1966), 12:185; Dictionary of 
National Biography, compact ed., 2 vols. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), s.v. John 
Mitford (quoting the appraisal of Sir Thomas Plumer [Jacob & Walker Reports, ii 151-52] 
that Mitford's treatise reduced "the whole subject to a system with such universally acknowl-
edged learning, accuracy, and discrimination, as to have been ever since received by the whole 
profession as an authoritative standard and guide"). Lord Eldon himself reportedly described 
Mitford's book as "a wonderful effort to collect what is to be deduced from authorities speak-
ing so little what is clear." Dictionary of National Biography, s. v. Mitford. 
22. Mitford also served as Solicitor General of England, 1793-99, and as Attorney Gen-
eral, 1799-1802, before his appointment as Lord Chancellor of Ireland. 
23. Lobban, "Part I," 417. 
24. Ibid., 422. 
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etrable nineteenth-century parliamentary forest, emerging on the threshold 
of the 1873 Judicature Act. Piecemeal legislation along the way eliminat-
ed some of the obvious drags on Chancery case-handling,25 and a bright-
ened Chancery future seemed to lie ahead. As was said by a contributor to 
the Edinburgh Review in 1875: "The Judicature Act crowns the edifice of 
legal improvement, which has been slowly built up since the beginning of 
the present century."26 Hopes for a more efficient court were, however, soon 
dashed. Instead of a bright new day, increased costs, confused rules of 
pleading, and an increased level of appeals darkened the dispensation of 
justice by what was now called the High Court of Justice.27 Fusion of law 
and equity had been accomplished, although perhaps it did "no more than 
fuse the administration of law and equity."28 Along the way, however, it had 
been discovered that law and equity were not "matter and anti-matter"-
"for many years before the Judicature Acts, law and equity had comple-
mented each other harmoniously."29 
25. Apart from those that have been mentioned was the crushingly inefficient requirement 
that all parties with any interest whatever in a case attend the court for any hearing of any 
aspect of the case. 
26. Edinburgh Review 14 (1875): 179, 180, as quoted in A. S. Manchester, A Modem Legal 
History of England and Wales, 1750-1950 (London: Butterworths, 1980), 149. 
27. Ibid., 148-49. 
28. Ibid., 149. 
29. Ibid. 
